Ahmad Shayeq Qasim
Professor of Australlian University
On the fateful day of November 12, 1893, Amir Abdul Rahman Khan of Afghanistan and Sir Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary of the British Indian government both agreed and signed upon the Durand Line Treaty, setting up the border between Afghanistan and then British India/present-day Pakistan. The nationalist Pashtuns have always resented this Line. When the country has more important issues to worry about, certain groups of ethno-centric Pashtuns refuse to let go of the Durand Line issue. This, of course, is just another way for them to further their own agendas in Afghanistan.
Politically-driven motives and agendas serve the interests of specific parties while harming everyone else involved—there is nothing new or even controversial about this statement. History as an overview is a record of these politically-driven agendas and the world today is nothing more than the outcomes of post-colonialism with the victors on one end and the defeated on the other. Artificially created states are the residues of the former colonialists being the fact that the state system was mostly a European creation, so to speak. Playing a game of geo-political hop-scotch, the European colonists set up states and upon leaving, they left successors and, in most cases, unpopular and unrepresentative regimes that ran each state. All of the states that were set up were multi-ethnic countries. In Afghanistan, every ethnic group is a minority whereas other states like Turkey, the leading ethnicity, Turks, made up about 70% of the country with the Kurds making up the minority. In Turkey, the Turks are the ruling class just like how the Arabs are the ruling class among countries like Iraq, Syria, etc. and like the Hindus in India, the Persians in Iran, and Punjabis in Pakistan.
Regardless of which group of successor was left in the countries by the Europeans, all the bureaucrats focused on the interests of their own ethnic group—whether it was the Turks, Pashtuns, Punjabis, etc.—instead of the interests of the pluralistic society as a whole. However, there is a difference between Afghanistan and the rest of the aforementioned countries. In Turkey, the Turks have established themselves politically, socially, economically, culturally, etc. They ran the Ottoman Empire, a once-powerful Empire, for a long period of time. As for the Persians, they have had thousands of years of culture and history, they ruled over great regions and their culture is recognized even to this day at the same time influencing other cultures. The Arabs have also conquered a great amount of land at one point, spreading their influence over the regions. The Hindus have an old culture that also still exists to this day and is very much respected and explored by others. Afghanistan, formed from parts of the Persian land of Khorasan, consists of different ethnic minority groups and has culturally, historically, and linguistically always followed the Persian culture. For Tajiks, Hazaras and the vast majority of Uzbeks and urbanized Pashtuns, their native tongue is Farsi/Dari. The nationalistic Pashtuns were threatened by this humiliating aspect because as the political successors, their culture and language was just an insignificant subculture of Khorasan and just limited to themselves. The tribes of Pashtuns are nomadic, underdeveloped, and to this day in order for them to be considered literate, they have to learn Farsi/Dari and even their ruling Pashtun elites have always adopted the Persian culture and language. Historically, for the most part they were always the subjects of Persians as well as the subjects of foreigners like the Turks, Arabs etc. It is interesting to note that Farsi is the lingua de franca in Iran just as Turkish is in Turkey and Arabic is in Iraq, etc. However, Afghanistan is Persian-dominated—speaking Farsi/Dari instead of Pashto as the nationalistic Pashtuns would like it to be. Schools, businesses, government, judicial systems—all use Farsi/Dari.
As expected, Pashtun groups such as the fascistic Afghan Mellat rose and opposed the adopted Persian culture and sought to Pashtunize the country through any means. However, not only did organization such as the Pashto Tolana which created the fraudulent Pota Khazana (Hidden Treasure) not have the desired results, they, in fact, caused greater problems because people made a mockery out of it and continue to make fun of it to this day. Forging their ethnicity percentage levels to reveal larger numbers did not prove to be a stabilizing factor and like everything else, it backfired on them, causing people to become infuriated with their tricky and devious tactics. And so, they turned once more to the Durand Line. The nationalistic Pashtuns continuously state that the Durand Line is void and that they should have full rights over the NWFP and Baluchistan.
As stated before, the Durand Line is simply a name for the border that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan; however, certain ethno-centric groups of Pashtuns have tried to exaggerate the subject to greater proportions by claiming that it is land rightfully due to them. What those nationalistic Pashtuns fail—or even refuse—to understand is that the Durand Line did not give or take any territory/land to British India or Afghanistan. Instead, it just demarcated the border between two countries; in other words, it is a line that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan, running from China to Persia. Even before the British came into the region, this border had already existed as a de facto border for almost a century with the Sikhs controlling the areas south of the line. Britain then basically replaced the Sikhs and invaded the regions of today’s Afghanistan (north side of the line) several times and took control of the whole region. Each time they retreated, they withdrew into British India—south side of today’s Durand line. The Durand Line treaty put an end to the fighting between the two oppositions, stating that neither side would try to interfere with the other. And most importantly, the treaty, agreeably signed by both parties, did not take property away from Afghanistan. Now, to raise their numbers and pursue their agendas, the nationalistic Pashtuns want to annex two of the four provinces of Pakistan, NWFP and Baluchistan (the other two provinces are Sindh and Punjab), and combine them with Afghanistan.
In a separate treaty with China, Britain gained control of Hong Kong for 99 years. Unlike the Durand Line Treaty, this treaty with China over the Hong Kong ports was indicated to last only 99 years. The Pashtun community of Afghanistan is mistakenly under the impression that the 1893 agreement between British India’s foreign minister, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan was for 99 or 100 years. This time limit is a rumor whose origins are unknown but repeated like a mantra by high-ranking politicians until they misled the country into thinking that the Durand Treaty was to be null and void in 1993. However, to date, no one has provided any sort of evidence that proves that the treaty was to last for 99 or 100 years. Over the years, the rumor became a myth due to the fact that there is not any valid documentation as proof. There are, however, documentations that prove just the opposite – that the Pashtun leaders had plenty of opportunities to invalidate the Durand Treaty but had instead chose to continuously uphold it. And the text of the Durand Treaty which provides proof to the legitimacy of the Durand Line’s existence is easily accessible in websites, encyclopedias and other various sources. Not to mention that two of the original copies of the Durand Treaty are still kept in the Museums of London, UK and in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.
The Durand Treaty as well as the documents created by the joint commissions of British India and Afghanistan from 1893 to 1896 regarding the physical demarcation of the border contained information on the border as well as the weaponry, ammunition, and annual payments that Amir Abdur Rahman would receive from Britain. It also stated that neither side would interfere with the other’s affairs. But there was no mention of a 99-100 year time limit placed on the treaty. The agreements were confirmed with both parties satisfied at the outcome. So it is perplexing as to how some members of one ethnic group came up with such a nonsensical allegation of a 100 year claim. All without any evidence. The only thing close to a time limit was the acknowledgement that the treaty was valid for however long Amir Abdur Rahman was king.
In 1901 Abdur Rahman died and his son, Amir Habibullah Khan, became king. For a while, Britain requested that Amir Habibullah Khan meet with their representative in Delhi, India so that they could go over the matters of mutual interests as well as the treaties that were upheld between Britain and Amir Abdur Rahman so that Amir Habibullah Khan, his son and Afghanistan’s new king, could go over the accords with them and sign them. Instead of meeting with Britain’s representative in Delhi, Amir Habibullah sent a message stating that there was no need for him to go to Delhi because he accepts and accredits all the agreements between his late father Amir Abdur Rahman and Britain. Britain, not satisfied with that response, insisted, and Amir Habibullah Khan, satisfied with the yearly payments of 1.8 million rupees, continuously refused. Britain was adamant, though, and they stopped their payments to Amir Habibullah. As soon as the funds stopped, Amir Habibullah immediately sent an invitation to Britain to set up a meeting with Britain’s representative. British viceroy in India, Lord Curzon, sent his foreign minister on an official visit to Kabul to meet with Amir Habibullah.
Instead of traveling to British India, Habibullah Khan was pleased to receive Sir Louis W. Dane, British India’s foreign minister, in Kabul. Toward the end of 1904 Dane arrived with new treaties and proposals which contained the same contents as the former documents i.e. the Durand Line, annual payments to the King, etc. The foreign minister of British India explained that though Abdur Rahman’s heir and successor was willing to accept his father’s past agreements, Britain was not willing to honor them because the death of the former king had nullified the original treaties. On March 21, 1905 Amir Habibullah had signed the documents and everything was re-instated. This was come to known as Dane Treaty which stated “In the words of His Majesty Amir Habibullah Khan: I hereby honor all the articles of Durand Treaty including all the other agreements and pacts that my late father signed with Britain’s representatives. I’ll act according to them and I’ll honor the pact of the Durand Line now and in the future.” The annual payments and weaponry was resumed and these new documents were valid until Amir Habibullah Khan’s assassination in 1919.
After the third Anglo-Afghan war, Afghanistan sent a team of diplomats headed by Ali Ahmad Khan, brother-in-law of King Amanullah Khan, to Rawalpindi, British India, on August 8, 1919 to sign a peace treaty with Britain. This team was to act fully on behalf of Afghanistan’s new government. A Peace Treaty was signed between the two parties. According to this new treaty, everything Britain had signed with the former governments of Afghanistan was null and void which included the Dane and Durand Treaty; Britain was no longer to provide annual payments and the shipments of weapons to Afghanistan’s leaders. However, in regards to the Durand Line, article five of the Peace Treaty recognized the legitimacy of the Durand Line as the accepted border between British India and Afghanistan, as it was recognized and accepted by Amir Habibullah Khan and by Amir Abdur Rahman before him. This was the first official and concrete recognition of the border between the two countries because it was accepted by the independent government of Afghanistan, the one that had fought against Britain, the one that was no longer dependant on Britain for money or weapons.
The Peace Treaty was just as its name suggested – an offering of peace between the warring sides. Article 4 of the Peace Treaty stated that if the new government of Afghanistan acts with sincerity and honesty with Britain for the first six months of the new treaty, the latter will then arrange for a diplomatic envoy to negotiate new accords. These meetings began in January of 1921 by Sir Henry R.C. Dobbs who headed a diplomatic team in Kabul to sign a new treaty as promised. On November 22, 1921, an establishment of commerce and declaration of friendly relations between Great Britain and Afghanistan was signed by Dobbs and Mahmud Tarzai, who was not only King Amanullah Khan’s foreign minister but also his father-in-law. Though this 1921 treaty replaced the Peace Treaty it still recognized the Durand Line as the international border between Afghanistan and British India as stated in Article 2 of the new treaty.
Interestingly enough Article 14 of the new agreement maintained that the authority was given to both countries that within three years of the treaty if either side wished to invalidate the treaty or any part of the treaty an official letter may be handed in by the party specifying so. Thus the treaty was signed by representatives of Britain and Afghanistan and within those initial three years and even after when King Amanullah was ousted and forced out of the country, neither side had submitted an official letter stating their dissatisfaction. During Nadir Khan’s reign, his brother Shah Wali, serving as Nadir’s ambassador in Great Britain, held a meeting in July of 1930 with Anderson Arthur, Britain’s foreign minister at that time in which a diplomatic agreement was signed stating that it was their honor to officially declare their understanding and full acceptance of the treaties of 1921 and of 1923.
It is plain to see that many opportunities had arose for the Afghan leaders to officially discredit and invalidate the Durand Line but they failed to do each and every time. Since the late treaty, the border has been internationally recognized and it would be irrelevant to continue to make it an issue today. Some people who act as experts in this field claim that the acceptance of the Durand Line was a price Amanullah Khan had to pay in order to get independence from Britain, that in order for Afghanistan to gain full independence from Great Britain they had to cede all future rights over that particular land. This weak excuse is not enough to discredit the legitimacy of all the documents that prove otherwise.
Some other self-proclaimed experts insist that Amir Abdur Rahman was forced into signing the original treaty which initiated the demarcation; according to such people, Amir Abdur Rahman was threatened by war or under threat of economic embargo and thus obligated to sign therefore nullifying the original treaty. However, the fact of the matter is that when Britain first suggested the demarcation, the Amir could not have been happier because the original intentions of the British were to build roads and railroads linking Kabul and Kandahar to other cities in British India. The Amir did not wish such roads to be built in Afghanistan and excitedly chose to have the demarcation instead.
As for the suggestion that the Amir might have regretted his decision, the original notes and diaries Abdur Rahman were found to show that he was very much satisfied with the treaty. In fact, afterwards, he had a grand party thrown in Kabul, celebrating his achievement on having stopped the British from entering Kabul and thus limiting their interference. To even suggested, now, that the Amir was forced to sign the treaty is preposterous because history has shown that the leaders after him have all signed documents and treaties that honored the original Durand Line agreement and it is unreasonable to think that all those other treaties were made under duress and force as well.
The border can not be changed or invalidated because the VCSSRT (Vienna Convention on Succession of States on Respect of Treaties) "world courts" have universally upheld uti possidetis juris—the concept that binding bilateral agreements with or between colonial powers are "passed down" to successor independent states. Afghanistan can not make the decision to invalidate the Durand Line nor can they spread misinformation that the treaty was only for 100 years. Though the original Durand Treaty did stipulate the conditions of the border on the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman, the fact that all the other leaders after Amir Abdur Rahman signed treaties and accords upholding the recognition of the border legitimized the Durand Line to the point where it no longer depended on the duration of the king’s reign. It thus was established as an international border like all of the world’s borders.
Today the Durand Line boundary remains in effect as the international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is recognized as such by most nations. Despite pervasive internet rumors to the contrary, US Department of State and the British Foreign Commonwealth Office documents and spokespersons have confirmed that the Durand Line, like virtually all international boundaries, has no expiration date, nor is there any mention of such in any Durand Line documents. Basically, by now trying to take over NWFP and Baluchistan (which constitute over half of Pakistan’s territory), the Pashtun nationalists are trying to break up Pakistan. It is unimaginable for Pakistan to give up such property to Afghanistan under any means. Pakistan is a populous state and a strong nation—militarily and economically—as well one of the seven declared nuclear states. Having the nationalistic Pashtuns argue about the Durand Line is not new for Pakistan because they have been over it for half a century but it has become a nuisance. As Pakistan continued to deny the nationalistic Pashtuns' cries for a "Pakhtunistan" or "Greater Afghanistan" by upholding the treaties Britain signed with Afghanistan, relations between the two countries became hostile to the point where Afghanistan's vote was the only one cast against Pakistan's admission to the United Nations in 1947. Afghanistan was also almost taken to the brink of war with Pakistan by the "crazy prince" Daud Khan, who was probably the biggest campaigner of capturing the NWFP.
Other ways of luring the Pakistani Pashtuns to Afghanistan have been employed. Western countries and the Eastern bloc during the Cold War were offering scholarships to the citizens of Afghanistan. The government of Zahir Shah and Daud Khan were distributing these scholarships to Pashtuns—dividing them between the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and the NWFP tribal areas. Non-pashtuns, although an absolute majority in Afghanistan, had no chance of receiving any of those scholarships. Zahir Shah had two schools built in Kabul by the names of Khoshal Khan High School and Rahman Baba High School. These schools were built primarily for the tribal Pashtuns of NWFP. At a time when Afghanistan couldn't even afford to build elementary schools in most parts of the country, the government was shamelessly building unnecessary schools for Pashtuns across the border and bringing them in by the thousands. They hoped the high schools would serve as an opening for the NWFP Pashtuns to become educated in Afghanistan and gain a sense of belonging because for the nationalistic Pashtuns, Afghanistan was the land of Pashtuns. However, once those Pakistani Pashtuns received their education in Afghanistan, they returned back to NWFP as loyal Pakistanis and became a part of the Pakistani establishments. They were opportunistic Pakistani Pashtuns and they just took advantage of the opportunity that was handed to them by Afghanistan's government, milking the country for all it was worth. For the most part of the second half of the twentieth century, the tribal Pashtuns used the government of Afghanistan in any way they could, having them financially cover their education expenses as well as receiving a steady salary from them.
A Ministry of Borders and Tribal Affairs was even established during Zahir Shah’s time and exists to this day. This Ministry solely concentrates on the Pakistani border even though Afghanistan shares its borders with five other countries: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and China. The purpose of this Ministry is to give the tribes of the Pashtuns living around that border area a regular salary as well as weapons under the pretense of having them protect the border. Even the Pashtuns on the Pakistani side receive Afghanistani ID cards, a steady salary and weapons for the same purpose. Not surprisingly, 90% of the violence comes from that region. Now, if the government refuses to acknowledge that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan exists, why bother having a Ministry dedicated to it as well as giving money and weapons for its protection?
If the Durand Line treaty is to be invalidated then every other British treaty is to be as well and that would ultimately mean that the name "Afghanistan" would cease to exist. The name "Afghanland" was first mentioned by the British in the Gadamak Treaty, set on May 26, 1879 between Sir Pierre Louis Napolean Cavagnari for the British and Amir Yaqub Khan of the "Afghans." Before that time, the region was known as Khorasan. Even the Pashtun Kings called themselves the Kings/Rulers/Amirs of Khorasan. So therefore, the name "Afghan/Afghanistan" would be just as invalid as the Durand Line. The name of "Afghanistan" has already had its own controversy and adding the Durand Line topic would only serve to the Pashtuns' disadvantage. The region of modern-day Afghanistan was a forceful occupation by Ahmed Shah Abdali and just as the ethno-centric Pashtuns want to claim that the Durand Line is illegal and invalid, one can also argue that Afghanistan's creation was illegal because of the fact that it was land belonging to the Safavids/Samanids which was basically stolen by Abdali and his tribes of Abdali and Gheljai.
Afghanistan being a multi-ethnic country would then have to disband if all notions of borders were dispelled. The British, along with the Russians, have created other borders and set up systematic states. Among them were borders between Iran and Afghanistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan/Uzbekistan/Turkmenistan. Logically then, the arguments used to try and invalidate the Durand Line can also be used for those borders. Why should the Pashtun areas of Pakistan be the only areas that have to merge with Afghanistan? The ethnic countries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan would rightfully lay claim to Tajik, Uzbek and Turkmen lands in Afghanistan and Iran would have rightful claim over the Western parts of Afghanistan. These ethnicities have much stronger claims over those lands because as non-Pashtuns, they would be the ruling majority. Also, why not have the Pashtuns merge with those regions of Pakistan instead of vice versa since the majority of Pashtuns live in Pakistan. It’s also noteworthy to point out that the Pashtuns have more in common with Pakistanis than they do with the other ethnicities of Afghanistan: Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, etc.
Trying to take away NWFP and Baluchistan is wishful thinking for the ethno-centric groups of Pashtuns. Baluchistan is the largest province of Pakistan and there are about six or seven million Baluchis living in that province. As a whole, Baluchis are divided between three countries: Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, 70%, 20%, 10% respectively. Racially, culturally, linguistically, there are no commonalities between the Baluchis and the Pashtuns. So now, who are these nationalistic Pashtuns to decide the fate of the Baluchis especially when they are divided amongst three countries? For their part, the Baluchis have never had any movement to want to break away from Pakistan and join Afghanistan. There might be small groups of fighting with the Pakistani government but they are not fighting for independence but for greater autonomy within the state of Pakistan. Even among the Pakistani Pashtuns, there has been no movement since the creation of Pakistan sixty years ago that would indicate that they want independence or that they even want to join Afghanistan. There has never even been an arms struggle—they only wanted to take advantage of all that Afghanistan was handing over to them, milking the Zahir Shah, Daud Khan, and even communist government. Logically, the Baluchis would not achieve anything by leaving Pakistan and joining Afghanistan. If they truly wanted independence, they would break away from all three countries and start their own state instead of merging with Afghanistan. The ethno-centric groups of Pashtuns, however, feel that they are looking out for the interests of the Baluchis by trying to get them into Afghanistan, where they would still be a minority. Clearly, their best interest is not being looked out for by these nationalistic Pashtuns. In fact, the nationalistic Pashtuns of Afghanistan are strategically going after Baluchistan because that province holds a bit more importance. Baluchistan has coastal areas and is rich with natural resources like petroleum, is not overpopulated, has vast amount of land, making it desirable for the nationalistic Pashtuns of Afghanistan. NWFP, on the other hand is a landlocked province, has no natural resources and is vastly populated with illiterate and tribal people.
The border does, in fact, run through and divides Pashtuns and Baluchis on both sides, but that is true for every ethnic group. In northern Afghanistan, the borders run through and divide Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmen between the countries of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan and in Western Afghanistan, the province of Herat is cut off and separated from Iran. One would not be able to distinguish the differences racially, linguistically, and culturally, between the Heratis and the Khorasan region of Iran, that is how close they are to each other. So nationalistic Pashtuns are not the only group that can claim to be divided by a border. They want to keep the other ethnic groups separate while they merge with other Pashtuns across the border. The ethno-centric groups of Pashtuns do not even consider that the other ethnicities will come up with the idea of tearing down the borders that separate them. In fact, Persian is the binding factor between majority people of Afghanistan, namely the Tajiks and Hazaras, with the neighboring countries of Tajikistan and Iran. And if they even so much as discussed the idea of a cultural reunification let alone a physical merging, the nationalistic Pashtuns would tell them to pack up and move out of Afghanistan altogether. What they don’t realize is that those different ethnic groups have settled in the regions for thousands of years and reside in about 75% of the land so it’s not likely that they would just pack up and move from country to another. The Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks etc. are not seasonal settlers like the nomadic Pashtuns; if they decide to leave, they will take the land with them.
Another thing is that the non-Pashtuns would never agree or even allow the influx of new Pashtuns onto their land to happen. They would adamantly be against Afghanistan going from 30% Pashtuns to 75% Pashtuns. Afghanistan would fall deeper into despair with larger groups of Pashtuns. The interests of non-Pashtuns would continue to be pushed back and ignored and more of their land would be stolen and given away to the Pakistani Pashtuns. The Afghan Mellat would grow and continue to take advantage of the destitute country and its people to further their agendas. Nationalistic Pashtuns have always forced their goal of Pashtunization unto the country. When not even one third of the country spoke Pashto, the previous Pashtun government still enforced Pashto as an official and national language. They named a major square in Kabul as Pashtunistan Square which refers to the NWFP Province; changed the writings on the currency to Pashto, as well as the writings on passports and the national IDs and also forced businesses in Kabul to change their signs to Pashto, and the governmental and educational institutions to adopt Pashto signs as replacements of the Farsi signs. Think of how much more forms of oppression the non-Pashtuns will face if the nationalistic Pashtuns succeed in bringing more Pashtuns into the country.
Nationalistic Pashtuns of Afghanistan have basically signed the death warrant of Afghanistan and its people with their talks of taking over the NWFP and suspending the Durand Line. It is because of those Pashtuns that Pakistan even began interfering with Afghan politics. As Afghanistan kept threatening to "take" the provinces, Pakistan then had to react and they did so by counterattacking with their own threats via Taliban. Right now, the Durand Line is described as "porous" with little there to stop the terrorists from going back in forth between the regions. Hamed Karzai and his Afghan Mellat advisors need to stop pouting over this issue and take drastic measures in securing the country. They need to accept and acknowledge an internationally-recognized border. They need to start neutralizing those tribal people on their side of the border and stop funding the tribes on the other side of the border.
However, Hamed Karzai's Minster of Borders and Tribal Affairs, Karim Barahowie, (an ethno-centric Pashtun) stood up in Parliament during the swearing-in ceremony and publicly refused to recognize the internationally recognized border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, namely the Durand Line. At the same time, though, Karzai claims that most of the terrorist attacks are initiated by the other side of the Line (a Line he claims not to recognize) and wants Pakistan to step in and control the area. This is a miserable two-sided look at the situation. On one hand, Karzai refuses to acknowledge the Line and, on the other hand, he wants Pakistan to control the territory because he refuses to claim responsibility for those trouble maker tribal people. Those are the Pashtuns Karzai wants to admit into the country and so therefore he should be the one to be held responsible for them. But it is simple enough: If you do not recognize the border that separates you from Pakistan, do NOT blame Pakistan for terrorist actions.
When the whole world including the UN acknowledges something as simple as the border that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan and ethno-centric groups of Pashtuns in Afghanistan can not, then the country will never fully recover. Karzai and the ethno-centric Pashtuns groups need to stop thinking emotionally and recognize what is best for the country, instead of what is best just for one minority ethnic group that they descend from. They need to be practical and realize when they are wrong. If not, then the people of Afghanistan will continue to suffer from the Taliban and foreign interference from Pakistan which would lead to the partition of the Afghanistan.
Montag, 18. Februar 2008
Searching Our Roots
This is part of a dabete going on in the Persian community, and most of the people share these ideas. In the wake of Globalization of economy which has its direct impacts on culture and nationalities, such discussions are a must to find a way from the deadlock we are facing now. Here is how an debator explains theories of Pan Iranism:
A) "Iran" - "Land of the nobles" - is not only the name of the modern "Islamic Republic", but also the name of the ENTIRE REGION also known as the "Iranian Plateau". "Iranians" are actually all former Iranian tribes (Bactrians, Sogdians, etc) who melted together after the GReek conquests, and who were totally united under Sassanid rule. Today, ALL Iranian tribes identify themselvs by their language: "Parsi". "Parsi" comes from "Persian", a Greek word. After the Greek conquest, all Iranian tribes adopted this word, because the Greks were caling all Iranians "Persians" (the same way we call everyone from India "Indian", although the country's real name is "Baharat")
B) The name of the official language of Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan is "Parsi". "Parsi" has many DIALECTS, such as Tehrani, Kabuli, Khorassani (Herat, Mashhad, etc), Mazari, Isfahani, Tajiki, etc etc etc. However, all of these DIALECTS have one common WRITTEN FORM OF EXPRESSIOn (=THE SAME SCRIPT): "Parsi-e Darbari", or short: "Dari". "Dari" is NOT A DIALECT. It is the WRITTEN form of the Persian language. It is the skeletton of the Persian language. Many Afghans call their dialect "Dari", but this is wrong. Afghanistan has many different Persian dialects. "Dari" is just the written langauge, like in news-papers or books.
C) "Tajik" is just another word for "Persian". In the past 1400 years, Persians had to face 2 important foreign invasions: Arabs and Turks. These two peoples (although Turks were divided into many different tribes) influenced Persian culture and identity. Although the Iranian people have always called themselvs and their lands "Iran", "Irani" or "Aryana", the foreign invaders never called them that way. The Greeks called them "Persians", the Arabs called them "Ajam", and Turks ... called them "Tajik". The word "Tajik" is a Turkish word and refers to ALL PERSIAN-speaking people of Central-Asia. Since the Seljuk-invasion 1000 years ago, the Persians of Central-Asia are being ruled by Turks. In those 1000 years, these Persians have adopted many Turkish expressions. And one of them is "Tajik". But still, the word "Tajik" was quite unknown until the Soviet rule. In the early 20th century, the Persians of Central-Asia (Samarqand and Bukhara) revolted against Stalin. For this, Stalin punished them by taking away their lands and giving them to Turks who cooperated with the new rulers in Moscow. That's how the "Uzbek SSR" was created. And at the same time, the Turkish word "Tajik" was forced on them, to alienate them from their people in Iran and Afghanistan, and to push Pan-Turkism on them. Today's Tajikistan is not even 1/5 of what used to be Persian lands in Central-Asia.
In Afghanistan, the word "Tajik" was forced on the Persians by the nationalist Pashtun kings who wanted to prevent a Pan-Iranism and Persian nationalism in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has always had good relation with Turkey, most of all because both countries are Non-Arab Sunni nations, while Iran is predominantly Shia. Turkey (after Attatürks revolutions) was training Afghanistan's army, and Afghanistan's kings were copying the Turkish militarism and the way to govern their nation. Both Pashtuns and Turks are traditional cultural enemies of Iran and Iranians. And that's why in both regions, in the Turkish dominated Central-Asia and in Pashtun-dominated Afghanistan, the word "Tajik" was forced on the Persians.
I am from Afghanistan. I was born in Kabul, and my ancestors are from Herat, Kabul, Balkh and Samarqand. I call myself "Persian" (="Parsi"), and I call my language "Parsi". I do not consider myself "Afghan", because "Afghan" is just another word for "Pashtun".
What I am trying to say is that the words "Persian", "Iran" or "Iranian" cannot be minimized to the present political borders of modern "Iran". The historical centers of IRAN and IRANIAN CULTURE are outside the borders of modern "Iran". Our modern, post-Islamic "Persian" was born at the courts of the Samanids in SAMARQAND and BUKHARA. The traditional Persian religion, Zoroastrism, was born in BACTRIA, modern Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The IRANIAN RESISTANCE against the Mongols started in Sabzavar near Herat, today's Afghanistan (today, the city is called "Shindand". In 1936, the Pashtun king Zahir Shah changed many Persian names into Pashto names). Some of the greatest Persian thinkers, including Rumi, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Nasser Khosrow, Jami, Ansari, Behzad, Abu-Muslim Khorassani, Imam Abu-Hanifa, Rabiya Balkhi, Rudaki, Daqiqi, Anwari, etc etc etc were from cities and centers OUTSIDE the borders of present-day "Iran".
Although I was born in what is called "Afghanistan", I consider myself as much part of the Iranian heritage and culture as someone being from tehran or Isfahan. Tajiks from Afghanistan or Tajikistan are more "Iranian" than Azeris or Turks from Iran.
http://www.languagehat.com/archives/000965.php
A) "Iran" - "Land of the nobles" - is not only the name of the modern "Islamic Republic", but also the name of the ENTIRE REGION also known as the "Iranian Plateau". "Iranians" are actually all former Iranian tribes (Bactrians, Sogdians, etc) who melted together after the GReek conquests, and who were totally united under Sassanid rule. Today, ALL Iranian tribes identify themselvs by their language: "Parsi". "Parsi" comes from "Persian", a Greek word. After the Greek conquest, all Iranian tribes adopted this word, because the Greks were caling all Iranians "Persians" (the same way we call everyone from India "Indian", although the country's real name is "Baharat")
B) The name of the official language of Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan is "Parsi". "Parsi" has many DIALECTS, such as Tehrani, Kabuli, Khorassani (Herat, Mashhad, etc), Mazari, Isfahani, Tajiki, etc etc etc. However, all of these DIALECTS have one common WRITTEN FORM OF EXPRESSIOn (=THE SAME SCRIPT): "Parsi-e Darbari", or short: "Dari". "Dari" is NOT A DIALECT. It is the WRITTEN form of the Persian language. It is the skeletton of the Persian language. Many Afghans call their dialect "Dari", but this is wrong. Afghanistan has many different Persian dialects. "Dari" is just the written langauge, like in news-papers or books.
C) "Tajik" is just another word for "Persian". In the past 1400 years, Persians had to face 2 important foreign invasions: Arabs and Turks. These two peoples (although Turks were divided into many different tribes) influenced Persian culture and identity. Although the Iranian people have always called themselvs and their lands "Iran", "Irani" or "Aryana", the foreign invaders never called them that way. The Greeks called them "Persians", the Arabs called them "Ajam", and Turks ... called them "Tajik". The word "Tajik" is a Turkish word and refers to ALL PERSIAN-speaking people of Central-Asia. Since the Seljuk-invasion 1000 years ago, the Persians of Central-Asia are being ruled by Turks. In those 1000 years, these Persians have adopted many Turkish expressions. And one of them is "Tajik". But still, the word "Tajik" was quite unknown until the Soviet rule. In the early 20th century, the Persians of Central-Asia (Samarqand and Bukhara) revolted against Stalin. For this, Stalin punished them by taking away their lands and giving them to Turks who cooperated with the new rulers in Moscow. That's how the "Uzbek SSR" was created. And at the same time, the Turkish word "Tajik" was forced on them, to alienate them from their people in Iran and Afghanistan, and to push Pan-Turkism on them. Today's Tajikistan is not even 1/5 of what used to be Persian lands in Central-Asia.
In Afghanistan, the word "Tajik" was forced on the Persians by the nationalist Pashtun kings who wanted to prevent a Pan-Iranism and Persian nationalism in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has always had good relation with Turkey, most of all because both countries are Non-Arab Sunni nations, while Iran is predominantly Shia. Turkey (after Attatürks revolutions) was training Afghanistan's army, and Afghanistan's kings were copying the Turkish militarism and the way to govern their nation. Both Pashtuns and Turks are traditional cultural enemies of Iran and Iranians. And that's why in both regions, in the Turkish dominated Central-Asia and in Pashtun-dominated Afghanistan, the word "Tajik" was forced on the Persians.
I am from Afghanistan. I was born in Kabul, and my ancestors are from Herat, Kabul, Balkh and Samarqand. I call myself "Persian" (="Parsi"), and I call my language "Parsi". I do not consider myself "Afghan", because "Afghan" is just another word for "Pashtun".
What I am trying to say is that the words "Persian", "Iran" or "Iranian" cannot be minimized to the present political borders of modern "Iran". The historical centers of IRAN and IRANIAN CULTURE are outside the borders of modern "Iran". Our modern, post-Islamic "Persian" was born at the courts of the Samanids in SAMARQAND and BUKHARA. The traditional Persian religion, Zoroastrism, was born in BACTRIA, modern Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The IRANIAN RESISTANCE against the Mongols started in Sabzavar near Herat, today's Afghanistan (today, the city is called "Shindand". In 1936, the Pashtun king Zahir Shah changed many Persian names into Pashto names). Some of the greatest Persian thinkers, including Rumi, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Nasser Khosrow, Jami, Ansari, Behzad, Abu-Muslim Khorassani, Imam Abu-Hanifa, Rabiya Balkhi, Rudaki, Daqiqi, Anwari, etc etc etc were from cities and centers OUTSIDE the borders of present-day "Iran".
Although I was born in what is called "Afghanistan", I consider myself as much part of the Iranian heritage and culture as someone being from tehran or Isfahan. Tajiks from Afghanistan or Tajikistan are more "Iranian" than Azeris or Turks from Iran.
http://www.languagehat.com/archives/000965.php
Afghanistan - The New Auschwitz
In the wake of the new invasion of Afghanistan after the 9/11 events, another human tragedy is taking place in that part of the world. When it comes to paying the price for staying in power, it is a horrifying fact, that the Karzai, being a Pashtoon, and his band of Afghan Mellatis, are willing to go far beyond killing their own people. Now imagine, what would they do to Tajik/Persian community in that territory? Here is an indepth analysis that would shed light even to Karzais life before becoming Mayor of Kaubl.
In addition to a bumper opium harvest, the US is reaping the whirlwind in Afghanistan...
According to Gideon Polya, based on UNESCO data, the US invasion of Afghanistan has led to as many as 6.6 million unnecessary deaths. According to Washburn University law professor Liaquat Ali Khan, the "crime of genocide applies to the intentional killings that NATO troops commit on a weekly basis in the poor villages and mute mountains of Afghanistan to destroy the Taliban." The occupation forces, which ironically include former Axis powers Germany and Japan, have created the New Auschwitz.
During a recent visit to Kabul by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Afghan President Hamid Karzai defended his rule, saying the economy and education systems had improved and there was more democratic freedom under the new constitution. "It is not right that Afghanistan was forgotten," he said. Meaning, in diplo-speak, of course, it was, except by the drug-crazed bomber pilots, who made a record-breaking 3,572 bombing raids last year, 20 times the level two years earlier. But it has popped back into the news recently with a string of gloomy reports, a series of terrifying shoot-outs in Kabul, and a high-profile NATO meeting where words were had, and not pretty ones.
The invasion - well into its seventh year and approaching the 1979-88 Soviet nine-year occupation record - is increasingly being compared to the ill-fated British 19th century invasions, intended to undermine Russian influence in the so-called Great Game. Ironically, the current fiasco was similarly inspired by a Western desire to undermine Russian influence, and, taking a different and as it turned out extremely risky tack, began in 1979 to massively fund Osama bin Laden and other Muslim terrorists, something the 19th century Brits were not so foolhardy as to do. The result, of course, was the 2001 invasion and occupation, at first hailed as a new chapter for the hapless Afghans, but now seen as doomed, according to that pesky string of reports.
Paddy Ashdown, the US choice as United Nations "proconsul", "superenvoy", whatever in Kabul, declared: "We are losing in Afghanistan." Quelle surprise, his appointment was vetoed by Karzai, who is desperately trying to portray himself as an independent leader of a country that has "turned the corner", despite the six million plus and the recent tiff over British military policy in the south, which Karzai claims led to the return of the Taliban. He complains that he was forced by the British to remove the governor of Helmand with disastrous consequences, and was furious that at the same time, Britain was secretly negotiating with the Taliban to set up "retirement camps" there for possible rebel defectors.
But then what should he expect? A US citizen and UNOCAL oil executive, he was parachuted into Afghanistan when the Americans invaded in 2001 and confirmed in US-orchestrated elections three years later. Widely regarded as a US-British stooge, the "mayor of Kabul" surely remembers the fate of his pre-Taliban predecessor, Mohamed Najibullah, who spent four years in a UN basement in Kabul until liberated - castrated and hung from a lamp-post by the Taliban in 1996.
Armed resistance to foreign occupation is growing and spreading. NATO figures show that attacks on Western and Afghan troops were up by almost a third last year, to more than 9,000 "significant actions", the highest level since the invasion. Seventy per cent of incidents took place in the southern Taliban heartland of Helmand, though the Senlis Council estimates that the Taliban now has a permanent presence in 54 per cent of Afghanistan, arguing that "the question now appears to be not if the Taliban will return to Kabul, but when." Watch out, Mr Karzai.
In addition to the 3,572 bombing raids in 2007, suicide bombings climbed to a record 140, compared to five between 2001 and 2005. The Taliban's base is increasingly the umbrella for a revived Pashtun nationalism on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, as well as for jihadists and others committed to fighting foreign occupation. The UN estimates the Taliban have just 3,000 active fighters and about 7,000 part-timers, in contrast with more than 50,000 US and NATO troops. Their command structure is diffuse and when it comes to guerrilla tactics - suicide attacks, roadside bombs, kidnapping and assassination - the militants have become frighteningly proficient.
"Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan," said a report issued 30 January by the Atlantic Council of the United States, chaired by retired General James Jones, who until 2006 served as the supreme allied commander of NATO in Afghanistan. "It remains a failing state. It could become a failed state," warned the report, which called for "urgent action" to overhaul NATO strategy in coming weeks before an anticipated new offensive by Taliban insurgents in the spring.
The Afghanistan Study Group, created by the Center for the Study of the Presidency, which was also involved with the Iraq Study Group, concluded, "the United States and the international community have tried to win the struggle in Afghanistan with too few military forces and insufficient economic aid," and lack a clear strategy to "fill the power vacuum outside Kabul and counter the combined challenges of reconstituted Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a runaway opium economy, and the stark poverty faced by most Afghans."
Whoa. Did it ever occur to these thinktankers that just maybe they can never "win"? That the US invaded Afghanistan illegally, and the Taliban, still the legitimate government there, will continue to battle on, to wait it out, no matter how many bombs and dollars the US et al throw at it?
As if these reports aren't enough for the frazzled president, on 15 January rebels attacked Kabul's swish five-star Serena Hotel, targeting the ex-pat elite in the most fortified site in the capital, killing seven guests and staff. This was no straightforward suicide bombing, but an armed attack which allowed the gunmen to carry out a shooting spree before they were stopped, the one phenomenon security agencies have no defence against. Kabul, relatively incident-free in the first two years after the removal of the Taliban, now sees regular rocket attacks, shootings, kidnappings, explosions and suicide bombings.
A few weeks after Serena, Kabul witnessed dozens of armed police laying siege to the house of Uzbek warlord and Chief of Staff to the Afghan commander-in-chief General Abdul-Rashid Dostum, in the heart of the diplomatic district, after 50 of his followers abducted political rival Akbar Bai and several others, beating them to a pulp. "This is a conspiracy by the government against General Dostum," loyalist Mohamed Alim Sayee said. "If any harm occurs to Dostum, seven to eight provinces will turn against the government." Watch out, Mr Karzai.
Major cracks are appearing every day, and not only in the statues of the Bamyan Buddha, but in impregnable fortress-NATO, the latest triggered by America's closest ally Canada. It set off the current crisis by threatening to withdraw all its troops this year unless other NATO members could be conned into deploying troops in the dangerous southern province of Kandahar, where in a brief two years, Canada lost 80 of its 2,500 troops, its highest casualty rate since native tribes were mowed down in the 19th century by the British army. This tantrum forced an emergency NATO meeting - in Vilnius - 7-8 February, to be followed by a summit in - yes - Romania in April. US generals meeting deep in Eastern Europe pushing Western Europeans to cough up troops for Central Asia. Most interesting.
Setting the stage the day before his junket to an obscure country which just happens to border Russia, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told the House Armed Services Committee that the alliance could split into countries that were "willing to fight and die to protect people's security and those who were not. You can't have some allies whose sons and daughters die in combat and other allies who are shielded from that kind of a sacrifice."
Did this blackmail work? Did Germany, Britain, Poland et al cough up? In the UK 62 per cent want all 7,800 troops withdrawn within a year. Similar polling results keep German Chancellor Angela Merkel from signing on the dotted line. She said it would send around 200 combat soldiers to north Afghanistan but no way would she bail out the Canadians. In Paris a spokesman for President Nicolas Sarkozy did not confirm reports that 700 paratroopers could go to the south. The Polish chief of the defence staff said the government is considering increasing their forces, despite being elected only last October expressly on a policy of bringing its troops home from Iraq and, presumably, Afghanistan. Only the US itself made any real effort to mollify the Canucks, agreeing to deploy 3,200 US Marines temporarily, but warning that the others must come through before the end of the year. Stay tuned.
At the love-in in Lithuania, Gates softened his undiplomatic language somewhat: "I don't think that there's a crisis, that there's a risk of failure." Which, in diplo-speak of course means there is a crisis, etc. Gates also squelched early suggestions that the US would take over command of combat operations in southern Afghanistan. "I don't think that's realistic any time soon," Gates said. Why bother? At present, an American four-star general is in overall command of the NATO mission. Americans are in command of the regional mission in eastern Afghanistan, while a Canadian is in command of the south.
"I worry that for many Europeans the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are confused," Gates said as he flew to Munich to deliver a speech at an international security conference 10 February. "Many of them, I think, have a problem with our involvement in Iraq and project that to Afghanistan and do not understand the very different - for them - the very different kind of threat." But wait! The US coordinator on Iraq, David Satterfield, suggested only last month that Iraq would turn out to be America's "good war", while Afghanistan was going "bad". Can't these guys get their story straight? Which is it, Mr Gates? Is good bad? Or is bad good? Just maybe bad is bad? Is that too hard to believe?
The original aims of the US-led invasion were the capture of Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, and Osama bin Laden, along with the destruction of Al-Qaeda. None of those aims has been achieved. Instead, the two leaders remain free, while Al-Qaeda has spread from its Afghan base into Pakistan, Iraq and elsewhere, and Afghanistan has become the heroin capital of the world. For the majority of Afghans, occupation has meant the exchange of obscurantist theocrats for brutal and corrupt warlords, rampant torture and insecurity, depleted uranium bombing and the 6.6 million deaths - all thanks to Western altruism. Even the early limited gains for women and girls in some urban areas are now being reversed, offset by an explosion of rape and violence against women.
What we see is a classic case of blowback. With the decision to expand NATO and use it as its proxy in illegal invasions after the collapse of the SU - notably Iraq, Serbia, Afghanistan and again Iraq - instead of dissolving it, the West is merely reaping its whirlwind in the form of unending war and now internal squabbles.
"Events in Afghanistan have become a motor for the transformation of the alliance," said a senior NATO diplomat. In fact, the collapse of Afghanistan is just another domino in a long line since the "victory over Communism". "Fail" a state (remember Bill Clinton's "grow the economy"?) and what do you get? The resurgence of Pashtun nationalism in southern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan, just like in the soon-to-be republics of Kosovo and Kurdistan. Long live independent Pashtunistan!
Will NATO bombs soon be raining down on Islamabad, demanding that Pakistan allow the heroic, suffering Pashtuns to unite with their brothers in a just liberation struggle? God knows there are Pashtun guerrilla groups who, like their Kosovan and Kurd soulmates, would eagerly accept US/NATO arms and protection. After all, the US once generously equipped them with Stinger missiles in their struggle to "liberate" Afghanistan.
***
Afghanistan in a nutshell
- Policies of the "international community" put immediate gains and Western interests before sustainable goals. In security, US Operation Enduring Freedom focussed solely on routing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, while NATO forces were confined largely to Kabul. Not until 2004 was security for the country considered. Even now, security operations in the country are compartmentalised into three distinct and uncoordinated areas, resulting in confusion and controversy. The global "war against terror" is conducted by US-led Coalition Forces; the counter-insurgency war is waged by the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force; the war against drugs is led by the Afghan police.
- The lack of troops means heavy reliance on air power with its concomitant "collateral damage", a euphemism for killing civilians.
- Instead of creating a strong national army and police force, occupiers now endorse the rearming of communities through the "auxiliary police", a euphemism for rearming the very warlords they spent five years trying to disarm.
- Relations with the Taliban follow the pendulum principle. All dissenters are lumped with the Taliban and policy swings between making peace with the Taliban to deporting those who dare talk to them, as the recent retirement camp scandal and deportation of German diplomats in December 2007 reveal.
- The 2004 constitution established a strong presidential system, stoking tensions in a war-torn state with tribal divisions, putting too much formal power in the hands of the winner, who has heavy responsibilities but little real authority, creating a breeding ground of nepotism and corruption. Karzai relies heavily on his Northern Alliance Tajik and Uzbek comrades, who make up 27 and 10 per cent of the population respectively, though Karzai is nominally Pashtun, the largest ethnic group. A more inclusive parliamentary system of government, with a ceremonial president or king and stronger local and regional governments, might help, though this would most likely just accelerate the present collapse of all central government and the return of warlord anarchy. At present, Karzai really only answers to a fractious cluster of foreign donors.
- Finally there is the one flourishing industry - opium and marijuana production. Opium production was up 34 per cent last year, 10 per cent of proceeds being tithed by the Taliban. Worse yet, it is not at all clear whether this is good or bad from a Western point of view, despite loud protestations about the evils of drugs. It is well documented that many governments in the region, not to mention the CIA, are deeply involved in both sides of the so-called war against drugs. The Taliban actually wiped out all drug production in 2000. Some critics of US foreign policy argue that the 2001 invasion was actually prompted by a distaste for this successful campaign, which led to a crisis in the European drug blackmarket.
***
By Eric Walberg
2-13-8
http://www.rense.com/general80/afghns.htm
Eric Walberg writes for Al-Ahram Weekly. You can reach him at www.geocities.com/walberg2002/
In addition to a bumper opium harvest, the US is reaping the whirlwind in Afghanistan...
According to Gideon Polya, based on UNESCO data, the US invasion of Afghanistan has led to as many as 6.6 million unnecessary deaths. According to Washburn University law professor Liaquat Ali Khan, the "crime of genocide applies to the intentional killings that NATO troops commit on a weekly basis in the poor villages and mute mountains of Afghanistan to destroy the Taliban." The occupation forces, which ironically include former Axis powers Germany and Japan, have created the New Auschwitz.
During a recent visit to Kabul by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Afghan President Hamid Karzai defended his rule, saying the economy and education systems had improved and there was more democratic freedom under the new constitution. "It is not right that Afghanistan was forgotten," he said. Meaning, in diplo-speak, of course, it was, except by the drug-crazed bomber pilots, who made a record-breaking 3,572 bombing raids last year, 20 times the level two years earlier. But it has popped back into the news recently with a string of gloomy reports, a series of terrifying shoot-outs in Kabul, and a high-profile NATO meeting where words were had, and not pretty ones.
The invasion - well into its seventh year and approaching the 1979-88 Soviet nine-year occupation record - is increasingly being compared to the ill-fated British 19th century invasions, intended to undermine Russian influence in the so-called Great Game. Ironically, the current fiasco was similarly inspired by a Western desire to undermine Russian influence, and, taking a different and as it turned out extremely risky tack, began in 1979 to massively fund Osama bin Laden and other Muslim terrorists, something the 19th century Brits were not so foolhardy as to do. The result, of course, was the 2001 invasion and occupation, at first hailed as a new chapter for the hapless Afghans, but now seen as doomed, according to that pesky string of reports.
Paddy Ashdown, the US choice as United Nations "proconsul", "superenvoy", whatever in Kabul, declared: "We are losing in Afghanistan." Quelle surprise, his appointment was vetoed by Karzai, who is desperately trying to portray himself as an independent leader of a country that has "turned the corner", despite the six million plus and the recent tiff over British military policy in the south, which Karzai claims led to the return of the Taliban. He complains that he was forced by the British to remove the governor of Helmand with disastrous consequences, and was furious that at the same time, Britain was secretly negotiating with the Taliban to set up "retirement camps" there for possible rebel defectors.
But then what should he expect? A US citizen and UNOCAL oil executive, he was parachuted into Afghanistan when the Americans invaded in 2001 and confirmed in US-orchestrated elections three years later. Widely regarded as a US-British stooge, the "mayor of Kabul" surely remembers the fate of his pre-Taliban predecessor, Mohamed Najibullah, who spent four years in a UN basement in Kabul until liberated - castrated and hung from a lamp-post by the Taliban in 1996.
Armed resistance to foreign occupation is growing and spreading. NATO figures show that attacks on Western and Afghan troops were up by almost a third last year, to more than 9,000 "significant actions", the highest level since the invasion. Seventy per cent of incidents took place in the southern Taliban heartland of Helmand, though the Senlis Council estimates that the Taliban now has a permanent presence in 54 per cent of Afghanistan, arguing that "the question now appears to be not if the Taliban will return to Kabul, but when." Watch out, Mr Karzai.
In addition to the 3,572 bombing raids in 2007, suicide bombings climbed to a record 140, compared to five between 2001 and 2005. The Taliban's base is increasingly the umbrella for a revived Pashtun nationalism on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, as well as for jihadists and others committed to fighting foreign occupation. The UN estimates the Taliban have just 3,000 active fighters and about 7,000 part-timers, in contrast with more than 50,000 US and NATO troops. Their command structure is diffuse and when it comes to guerrilla tactics - suicide attacks, roadside bombs, kidnapping and assassination - the militants have become frighteningly proficient.
"Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan," said a report issued 30 January by the Atlantic Council of the United States, chaired by retired General James Jones, who until 2006 served as the supreme allied commander of NATO in Afghanistan. "It remains a failing state. It could become a failed state," warned the report, which called for "urgent action" to overhaul NATO strategy in coming weeks before an anticipated new offensive by Taliban insurgents in the spring.
The Afghanistan Study Group, created by the Center for the Study of the Presidency, which was also involved with the Iraq Study Group, concluded, "the United States and the international community have tried to win the struggle in Afghanistan with too few military forces and insufficient economic aid," and lack a clear strategy to "fill the power vacuum outside Kabul and counter the combined challenges of reconstituted Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a runaway opium economy, and the stark poverty faced by most Afghans."
Whoa. Did it ever occur to these thinktankers that just maybe they can never "win"? That the US invaded Afghanistan illegally, and the Taliban, still the legitimate government there, will continue to battle on, to wait it out, no matter how many bombs and dollars the US et al throw at it?
As if these reports aren't enough for the frazzled president, on 15 January rebels attacked Kabul's swish five-star Serena Hotel, targeting the ex-pat elite in the most fortified site in the capital, killing seven guests and staff. This was no straightforward suicide bombing, but an armed attack which allowed the gunmen to carry out a shooting spree before they were stopped, the one phenomenon security agencies have no defence against. Kabul, relatively incident-free in the first two years after the removal of the Taliban, now sees regular rocket attacks, shootings, kidnappings, explosions and suicide bombings.
A few weeks after Serena, Kabul witnessed dozens of armed police laying siege to the house of Uzbek warlord and Chief of Staff to the Afghan commander-in-chief General Abdul-Rashid Dostum, in the heart of the diplomatic district, after 50 of his followers abducted political rival Akbar Bai and several others, beating them to a pulp. "This is a conspiracy by the government against General Dostum," loyalist Mohamed Alim Sayee said. "If any harm occurs to Dostum, seven to eight provinces will turn against the government." Watch out, Mr Karzai.
Major cracks are appearing every day, and not only in the statues of the Bamyan Buddha, but in impregnable fortress-NATO, the latest triggered by America's closest ally Canada. It set off the current crisis by threatening to withdraw all its troops this year unless other NATO members could be conned into deploying troops in the dangerous southern province of Kandahar, where in a brief two years, Canada lost 80 of its 2,500 troops, its highest casualty rate since native tribes were mowed down in the 19th century by the British army. This tantrum forced an emergency NATO meeting - in Vilnius - 7-8 February, to be followed by a summit in - yes - Romania in April. US generals meeting deep in Eastern Europe pushing Western Europeans to cough up troops for Central Asia. Most interesting.
Setting the stage the day before his junket to an obscure country which just happens to border Russia, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told the House Armed Services Committee that the alliance could split into countries that were "willing to fight and die to protect people's security and those who were not. You can't have some allies whose sons and daughters die in combat and other allies who are shielded from that kind of a sacrifice."
Did this blackmail work? Did Germany, Britain, Poland et al cough up? In the UK 62 per cent want all 7,800 troops withdrawn within a year. Similar polling results keep German Chancellor Angela Merkel from signing on the dotted line. She said it would send around 200 combat soldiers to north Afghanistan but no way would she bail out the Canadians. In Paris a spokesman for President Nicolas Sarkozy did not confirm reports that 700 paratroopers could go to the south. The Polish chief of the defence staff said the government is considering increasing their forces, despite being elected only last October expressly on a policy of bringing its troops home from Iraq and, presumably, Afghanistan. Only the US itself made any real effort to mollify the Canucks, agreeing to deploy 3,200 US Marines temporarily, but warning that the others must come through before the end of the year. Stay tuned.
At the love-in in Lithuania, Gates softened his undiplomatic language somewhat: "I don't think that there's a crisis, that there's a risk of failure." Which, in diplo-speak of course means there is a crisis, etc. Gates also squelched early suggestions that the US would take over command of combat operations in southern Afghanistan. "I don't think that's realistic any time soon," Gates said. Why bother? At present, an American four-star general is in overall command of the NATO mission. Americans are in command of the regional mission in eastern Afghanistan, while a Canadian is in command of the south.
"I worry that for many Europeans the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are confused," Gates said as he flew to Munich to deliver a speech at an international security conference 10 February. "Many of them, I think, have a problem with our involvement in Iraq and project that to Afghanistan and do not understand the very different - for them - the very different kind of threat." But wait! The US coordinator on Iraq, David Satterfield, suggested only last month that Iraq would turn out to be America's "good war", while Afghanistan was going "bad". Can't these guys get their story straight? Which is it, Mr Gates? Is good bad? Or is bad good? Just maybe bad is bad? Is that too hard to believe?
The original aims of the US-led invasion were the capture of Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, and Osama bin Laden, along with the destruction of Al-Qaeda. None of those aims has been achieved. Instead, the two leaders remain free, while Al-Qaeda has spread from its Afghan base into Pakistan, Iraq and elsewhere, and Afghanistan has become the heroin capital of the world. For the majority of Afghans, occupation has meant the exchange of obscurantist theocrats for brutal and corrupt warlords, rampant torture and insecurity, depleted uranium bombing and the 6.6 million deaths - all thanks to Western altruism. Even the early limited gains for women and girls in some urban areas are now being reversed, offset by an explosion of rape and violence against women.
What we see is a classic case of blowback. With the decision to expand NATO and use it as its proxy in illegal invasions after the collapse of the SU - notably Iraq, Serbia, Afghanistan and again Iraq - instead of dissolving it, the West is merely reaping its whirlwind in the form of unending war and now internal squabbles.
"Events in Afghanistan have become a motor for the transformation of the alliance," said a senior NATO diplomat. In fact, the collapse of Afghanistan is just another domino in a long line since the "victory over Communism". "Fail" a state (remember Bill Clinton's "grow the economy"?) and what do you get? The resurgence of Pashtun nationalism in southern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan, just like in the soon-to-be republics of Kosovo and Kurdistan. Long live independent Pashtunistan!
Will NATO bombs soon be raining down on Islamabad, demanding that Pakistan allow the heroic, suffering Pashtuns to unite with their brothers in a just liberation struggle? God knows there are Pashtun guerrilla groups who, like their Kosovan and Kurd soulmates, would eagerly accept US/NATO arms and protection. After all, the US once generously equipped them with Stinger missiles in their struggle to "liberate" Afghanistan.
***
Afghanistan in a nutshell
- Policies of the "international community" put immediate gains and Western interests before sustainable goals. In security, US Operation Enduring Freedom focussed solely on routing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, while NATO forces were confined largely to Kabul. Not until 2004 was security for the country considered. Even now, security operations in the country are compartmentalised into three distinct and uncoordinated areas, resulting in confusion and controversy. The global "war against terror" is conducted by US-led Coalition Forces; the counter-insurgency war is waged by the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force; the war against drugs is led by the Afghan police.
- The lack of troops means heavy reliance on air power with its concomitant "collateral damage", a euphemism for killing civilians.
- Instead of creating a strong national army and police force, occupiers now endorse the rearming of communities through the "auxiliary police", a euphemism for rearming the very warlords they spent five years trying to disarm.
- Relations with the Taliban follow the pendulum principle. All dissenters are lumped with the Taliban and policy swings between making peace with the Taliban to deporting those who dare talk to them, as the recent retirement camp scandal and deportation of German diplomats in December 2007 reveal.
- The 2004 constitution established a strong presidential system, stoking tensions in a war-torn state with tribal divisions, putting too much formal power in the hands of the winner, who has heavy responsibilities but little real authority, creating a breeding ground of nepotism and corruption. Karzai relies heavily on his Northern Alliance Tajik and Uzbek comrades, who make up 27 and 10 per cent of the population respectively, though Karzai is nominally Pashtun, the largest ethnic group. A more inclusive parliamentary system of government, with a ceremonial president or king and stronger local and regional governments, might help, though this would most likely just accelerate the present collapse of all central government and the return of warlord anarchy. At present, Karzai really only answers to a fractious cluster of foreign donors.
- Finally there is the one flourishing industry - opium and marijuana production. Opium production was up 34 per cent last year, 10 per cent of proceeds being tithed by the Taliban. Worse yet, it is not at all clear whether this is good or bad from a Western point of view, despite loud protestations about the evils of drugs. It is well documented that many governments in the region, not to mention the CIA, are deeply involved in both sides of the so-called war against drugs. The Taliban actually wiped out all drug production in 2000. Some critics of US foreign policy argue that the 2001 invasion was actually prompted by a distaste for this successful campaign, which led to a crisis in the European drug blackmarket.
***
By Eric Walberg
2-13-8
http://www.rense.com/general80/afghns.htm
Eric Walberg writes for Al-Ahram Weekly. You can reach him at www.geocities.com/walberg2002/
Afghanistan and Pakistan Face Threat of Talibanization
Pakistan for has always felt the necessity of keeping the Pashtoon Nationalist Movement at stall. They have no illusions about territorial claims of the Pashtoon tribes inside Afghanistan and Pakistan. On the other hand, having a Pashtoon Nationlaist Movement in Pakistan, is like fighting another war, in their own backyard. This would put them in a dangeours situation where they would have a fifth line of Indian army behind their backs when it comes to war between these two nations. Even at times of peace, this would mean that indian government, or any other neighboring nation, could make use this force to blakmail Pakistan's central government. Here is an analysis of the situation by a Pakistani Journalist.
The bilateral relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan remains frozen and is governed by the two countries' geopolitical rivalries, which have unwittingly helped Taliban militancy in the region. As a result, both states are in danger of "Talibanization" (Dawn, April 27). The immediate challenges that face Afghanistan and Pakistan have to do with four factors: (a) cross-border infiltration; (b) a territorial dispute centering on the Durand Line; (c) India's growing influence with Kabul; and (d) Pakistan's Afghan policy, which is opposed by all factions in Afghanistan including Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Pashtun nationalists and even the Taliban (Dawn, November 13, 2005).
Infiltration into Afghanistan
Frustrated by Islamabad's tepid response to his repeated calls for disabling the Taliban's operational bases in Pakistan, Afghan President Hamid Karzai turned to personal diplomacy. On February 15-17, he made a three-day visit to Islamabad to seek its cooperation in ending terrorist violence. He conveyed to Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf his deep concern over the recent spike in lethal violence in southern Afghanistan (Dawn, February 16). In 2005, Afghanistan watched 1,700 people die in insurgent violence. In the three months since December 2005, 70 people, predominantly members of the security forces, were killed in suicide bombings. In March, Taliban leader Mullah Omar vowed that "with the beginning of summer, Afghan soil will turn red for the crusaders and their puppets, and the occupiers will face an unpredictable wave of Afghan resistance" (The News, March 17).
President Karzai believes that the Taliban have their bases in Pakistan, where even their leader Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden have found safe haven (Dawn, February 26). In his one-on-one meeting with Musharraf on February 15, Karzai shared with him "verifiable" intelligence about 150 key Taliban suspects who are based in Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta (Dawn, February 26). Pakistan's security agencies, however, found Afghan intelligence "unreliable."
Infiltration into the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)
Like Afghanistan, Pakistan is battling a violent insurgency in its northwestern and southwestern provinces. The situation in Waziristan in northwestern Pakistan, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, has spiraled out of Islamabad's control. On February 17, Tolo, an independent Afghan television news channel, aired grisly scenes of men in South Waziristan holding up three severed heads to a crowd chanting, "Long Live Osama bin Laden. Long Live Mullah Omar" (Dawn, April 18). It also showed half a dozen corpses chained to a vehicle and being dragged, while a uniformed Pakistan military officer drives past.
The Taliban have so far executed 150 pro-government tribal chiefs without getting punished for their crimes (Daily Times, April 18). Similarly, the losses in life of government troops have grown five times more than those of U.S. troops in Afghanistan (Dawn, April 21). Between January 2003 and April 2006, 600 Pakistani soldiers were killed, while 200 U.S. troops have died in Afghanistan since 2001 (The Nation, April 29).
Yet, critics say, the military operation in Waziristan has not yielded one single terrorist dead or alive since 2003 (Nawa-i-Waqt, March 11). Most terrorists have rather been arrested in Karachi, Hyderabad, Lahore, Faisalabad and Gujrat. Islamabad, however, has claimed for the past three years that these operations have been a success. Pakistan's most pro-Afghan and pro-Karzai Pashtun leader, Asfandyar Wali Khan, blames the ISI (Pakistan's intelligence agency) for orchestrating military operations in Waziristan to deflect attention from its "guests" elsewhere. Mehmood Khan Achackzai, another prominent pro-Afghan and pro-Karzai Pashtun leader from Balochistan, calls the military operation in Waziristan a "genocide of Pashtuns," which he wants ceased immediately. Despite the military operation, Waziristan, which the Taliban has declared as its "Islamic Emirate," has steadily slid into anarchy. Stunned by their sweeping reach, Musharraf publicly announced on April 26 his plan to pull out troops from North and South Waziristan (Dawn, April 27). Despite this unenviable performance, the United States continues to offer Pakistan $840 million a year in military aid for its operations in Waziristan (Dawn, April 21).
Infiltration into Southwestern Pakistan: Balochistan
Similarly, Pakistan is battling an even fiercer insurgency in Balochistan, which it blames on Afghanistan. During his recent visit to Islamabad, Pakistan shared intelligence with President Karzai on "weapons smuggling into Balochistan" (China Brief, March 2). Pakistan also raised the matter at the Tripartite Commission's meeting in Kabul on February 25.
In addition, Pakistani intelligence officials claim to have proof of India's involvement in Balochistan, which is accused of funding and arming the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) (Khabrain, February 25). In April, Pakistan banned the BLA as a "terrorist" organization. The United States has not yet agreed to Pakistan's assessment of the BLA. Most recently, Pakistan claimed to have seized weapons worth 500 million rupees (around $8.3 million), which were shipped from Kabul for subversion in Balochistan (The Nation, February 12).
Pakistan wants Afghanistan to have India close its consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar, each of which borders the NWFP (also known as Pakhtunkhaw) and Balochistan. President Karzai, however, disagrees that his country's scaled-back relations with New Delhi will make Pakistan safe. Responding to charges that Afghanistan is behind the Baloch insurgency, he said: "We will never support an insurgency in Balochistan or allow the use of our soil for terrorist activities" (Dawn, February 18). Pakistan is not convinced, however. As a precaution and at great financial cost, it already has deployed 90,000 troops along the Durand Line since the fall of the Taliban (Nawa-i-Waqt, September 13, 2005). In addition, 70,000 members of Pakistan's Frontier Corps are deployed in the border areas.
Fencing the Durand Line
To bolster cross-border security, Pakistan has proposed to fence the 2,300-kilometer Durand Line. Karzai off-handedly rejected the proposal, saying that "barbed wire is a symbol of hatred, not friendship and hence it cannot stop terrorism" (Dawn, February 18). Earlier, speaking at the National Defense College on February 16, he said: "fencing is separation" of the "inseparable" people living on each side of Durand Line (The Nation, February 17). Pakistan has long been toying with the idea of fencing. In September 2005, Musharraf shared the idea with President Bush, who publicly endorsed it. Karzai's rejection of fencing further confounds the issue of the undefined border between the two countries.
Since it was drawn in 1893, the Durand Line has been a tentative marker between Afghanistan and British Raj, which divided Baloch and Pashtun tribal areas on both sides. Afghanistan gave the British Raj its southern territories in Balochistan and the NWFP on a 100-year lease, which expired in 1993. Pakistan has since been pressing Kabul to accept the Durand Line as an international border. Kabul, however, is unwilling to cede its historical claim to the territories it calls "South Pashtunistan" (Dawn, November 13, 2005). Even the Pakistan-backed Taliban government (1996-2001) refused to accept the Durand Line as an "international border." It was this unsolved border dispute that led Afghanistan to oppose Pakistan's entry into the United Nations in 1948, which sowed the first seed of a long-festering disagreement that continues to haunt both countries to this day.
The India Factor
To Pakistan's dismay, however, Afghanistan, with the help of India, crossed the Durand Line into South Asia as the eighth member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Pakistan fears that Afghanistan will use SAARC to raise "the bogey of South Pashtunistan" (Dawn, November 13, 2005). More importantly, Pakistan is concerned about India's increasing influence with Kabul, especially its ruling Northern Alliance. A recent Indian move to deploy 300 members of its special operations forces at its consulate in Kandahar has further unnerved Islamabad (WebIndia123.com). Musharraf, during his meeting with Karzai on February 15, reportedly broached this matter with serious concern.
With or without Afghanistan's help, India is, nevertheless, well on its way to flanking Pakistan's western border and penetrating Central Asia with its economic allure and military muscle. It has already completed the construction of its first-ever foreign military base in Tajikistan to the west of Pakistan (Nawa-i-Waqt, March 6). It is also building a port at Chahbahar in Iran, Pakistan's southwestern neighbor, that will be connected through a road link to Afghanistan and then to Central Asia. Pakistan, which has problematic relations with all three states—Afghanistan, Iran and Tajikistan—views their triangular axis as an Indian attempt to encircle it at its western border.
Pakistan's Afghan Policy
Pakistan's Afghan policy is not helping matters either. It continues to be based on the ethnic subordination of Afghanistan (Nawa-i-Waqt, April 17). Although Pakistan likes to see Pashtuns get their due share in Afghanistan's governance, it rejects their "ethnic nationalism," compared to the Taliban's "Islamic nationalism" (The International Journal of Contemporary Sociology, vol. 42(2), pp. 267-293). Pakistan is apprehensive that Pashtun ethnic nationalism will infect Pakistani Pashtuns, whom Islamabad continues to keep de-politicized and thus theologized (The International Journal of Contemporary Sociology, vol. 42(2), pp. 267-293). It bars Pashtun nationalist parties, such as the NWFP-based Awami National Party (ANP) led by Asfandyar Wali Khan, and the Balochistan-based Pashtunkhawa Milli Awami Party (PMAP) led by Mehmood Khan Achakzai, from entering tribal areas of Balochistan and the NWFP, while the Taliban and their militant allies are free to establish an "Islamic Emirate" there.
Conclusions
Not until the "Talibanization" of Afghanistan and Pakistan has been addressed can geopolitical and geoeconomic considerations take center stage. It is, therefore, imperative for Afghanistan and Pakistan to concentrate on stemming cross-border infiltration, which will require the redeployment of Pakistani troops from the tribal areas of the NWFP and Balochistan to joint patrolling the Durand Line. Pakistan should replace its military operation in the NWFP and Balochistan with a political process, allowing Pakistan's mainstream political parties as well as Pashtun nationalists to defuse the ticking bomb of religious fanaticism there. More importantly, Pakistan's Afghan policy needs a makeover from the current ethnic subordination of Afghanistan and the demeaning of Pashtun nationalism, to the affirmation of Afghan nationalism and Pashtun ethnic pride to counter the Taliban's "religious nationalism."
By Tarique Niazi
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370000
The bilateral relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan remains frozen and is governed by the two countries' geopolitical rivalries, which have unwittingly helped Taliban militancy in the region. As a result, both states are in danger of "Talibanization" (Dawn, April 27). The immediate challenges that face Afghanistan and Pakistan have to do with four factors: (a) cross-border infiltration; (b) a territorial dispute centering on the Durand Line; (c) India's growing influence with Kabul; and (d) Pakistan's Afghan policy, which is opposed by all factions in Afghanistan including Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Pashtun nationalists and even the Taliban (Dawn, November 13, 2005).
Infiltration into Afghanistan
Frustrated by Islamabad's tepid response to his repeated calls for disabling the Taliban's operational bases in Pakistan, Afghan President Hamid Karzai turned to personal diplomacy. On February 15-17, he made a three-day visit to Islamabad to seek its cooperation in ending terrorist violence. He conveyed to Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf his deep concern over the recent spike in lethal violence in southern Afghanistan (Dawn, February 16). In 2005, Afghanistan watched 1,700 people die in insurgent violence. In the three months since December 2005, 70 people, predominantly members of the security forces, were killed in suicide bombings. In March, Taliban leader Mullah Omar vowed that "with the beginning of summer, Afghan soil will turn red for the crusaders and their puppets, and the occupiers will face an unpredictable wave of Afghan resistance" (The News, March 17).
President Karzai believes that the Taliban have their bases in Pakistan, where even their leader Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden have found safe haven (Dawn, February 26). In his one-on-one meeting with Musharraf on February 15, Karzai shared with him "verifiable" intelligence about 150 key Taliban suspects who are based in Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta (Dawn, February 26). Pakistan's security agencies, however, found Afghan intelligence "unreliable."
Infiltration into the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)
Like Afghanistan, Pakistan is battling a violent insurgency in its northwestern and southwestern provinces. The situation in Waziristan in northwestern Pakistan, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, has spiraled out of Islamabad's control. On February 17, Tolo, an independent Afghan television news channel, aired grisly scenes of men in South Waziristan holding up three severed heads to a crowd chanting, "Long Live Osama bin Laden. Long Live Mullah Omar" (Dawn, April 18). It also showed half a dozen corpses chained to a vehicle and being dragged, while a uniformed Pakistan military officer drives past.
The Taliban have so far executed 150 pro-government tribal chiefs without getting punished for their crimes (Daily Times, April 18). Similarly, the losses in life of government troops have grown five times more than those of U.S. troops in Afghanistan (Dawn, April 21). Between January 2003 and April 2006, 600 Pakistani soldiers were killed, while 200 U.S. troops have died in Afghanistan since 2001 (The Nation, April 29).
Yet, critics say, the military operation in Waziristan has not yielded one single terrorist dead or alive since 2003 (Nawa-i-Waqt, March 11). Most terrorists have rather been arrested in Karachi, Hyderabad, Lahore, Faisalabad and Gujrat. Islamabad, however, has claimed for the past three years that these operations have been a success. Pakistan's most pro-Afghan and pro-Karzai Pashtun leader, Asfandyar Wali Khan, blames the ISI (Pakistan's intelligence agency) for orchestrating military operations in Waziristan to deflect attention from its "guests" elsewhere. Mehmood Khan Achackzai, another prominent pro-Afghan and pro-Karzai Pashtun leader from Balochistan, calls the military operation in Waziristan a "genocide of Pashtuns," which he wants ceased immediately. Despite the military operation, Waziristan, which the Taliban has declared as its "Islamic Emirate," has steadily slid into anarchy. Stunned by their sweeping reach, Musharraf publicly announced on April 26 his plan to pull out troops from North and South Waziristan (Dawn, April 27). Despite this unenviable performance, the United States continues to offer Pakistan $840 million a year in military aid for its operations in Waziristan (Dawn, April 21).
Infiltration into Southwestern Pakistan: Balochistan
Similarly, Pakistan is battling an even fiercer insurgency in Balochistan, which it blames on Afghanistan. During his recent visit to Islamabad, Pakistan shared intelligence with President Karzai on "weapons smuggling into Balochistan" (China Brief, March 2). Pakistan also raised the matter at the Tripartite Commission's meeting in Kabul on February 25.
In addition, Pakistani intelligence officials claim to have proof of India's involvement in Balochistan, which is accused of funding and arming the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) (Khabrain, February 25). In April, Pakistan banned the BLA as a "terrorist" organization. The United States has not yet agreed to Pakistan's assessment of the BLA. Most recently, Pakistan claimed to have seized weapons worth 500 million rupees (around $8.3 million), which were shipped from Kabul for subversion in Balochistan (The Nation, February 12).
Pakistan wants Afghanistan to have India close its consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar, each of which borders the NWFP (also known as Pakhtunkhaw) and Balochistan. President Karzai, however, disagrees that his country's scaled-back relations with New Delhi will make Pakistan safe. Responding to charges that Afghanistan is behind the Baloch insurgency, he said: "We will never support an insurgency in Balochistan or allow the use of our soil for terrorist activities" (Dawn, February 18). Pakistan is not convinced, however. As a precaution and at great financial cost, it already has deployed 90,000 troops along the Durand Line since the fall of the Taliban (Nawa-i-Waqt, September 13, 2005). In addition, 70,000 members of Pakistan's Frontier Corps are deployed in the border areas.
Fencing the Durand Line
To bolster cross-border security, Pakistan has proposed to fence the 2,300-kilometer Durand Line. Karzai off-handedly rejected the proposal, saying that "barbed wire is a symbol of hatred, not friendship and hence it cannot stop terrorism" (Dawn, February 18). Earlier, speaking at the National Defense College on February 16, he said: "fencing is separation" of the "inseparable" people living on each side of Durand Line (The Nation, February 17). Pakistan has long been toying with the idea of fencing. In September 2005, Musharraf shared the idea with President Bush, who publicly endorsed it. Karzai's rejection of fencing further confounds the issue of the undefined border between the two countries.
Since it was drawn in 1893, the Durand Line has been a tentative marker between Afghanistan and British Raj, which divided Baloch and Pashtun tribal areas on both sides. Afghanistan gave the British Raj its southern territories in Balochistan and the NWFP on a 100-year lease, which expired in 1993. Pakistan has since been pressing Kabul to accept the Durand Line as an international border. Kabul, however, is unwilling to cede its historical claim to the territories it calls "South Pashtunistan" (Dawn, November 13, 2005). Even the Pakistan-backed Taliban government (1996-2001) refused to accept the Durand Line as an "international border." It was this unsolved border dispute that led Afghanistan to oppose Pakistan's entry into the United Nations in 1948, which sowed the first seed of a long-festering disagreement that continues to haunt both countries to this day.
The India Factor
To Pakistan's dismay, however, Afghanistan, with the help of India, crossed the Durand Line into South Asia as the eighth member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Pakistan fears that Afghanistan will use SAARC to raise "the bogey of South Pashtunistan" (Dawn, November 13, 2005). More importantly, Pakistan is concerned about India's increasing influence with Kabul, especially its ruling Northern Alliance. A recent Indian move to deploy 300 members of its special operations forces at its consulate in Kandahar has further unnerved Islamabad (WebIndia123.com). Musharraf, during his meeting with Karzai on February 15, reportedly broached this matter with serious concern.
With or without Afghanistan's help, India is, nevertheless, well on its way to flanking Pakistan's western border and penetrating Central Asia with its economic allure and military muscle. It has already completed the construction of its first-ever foreign military base in Tajikistan to the west of Pakistan (Nawa-i-Waqt, March 6). It is also building a port at Chahbahar in Iran, Pakistan's southwestern neighbor, that will be connected through a road link to Afghanistan and then to Central Asia. Pakistan, which has problematic relations with all three states—Afghanistan, Iran and Tajikistan—views their triangular axis as an Indian attempt to encircle it at its western border.
Pakistan's Afghan Policy
Pakistan's Afghan policy is not helping matters either. It continues to be based on the ethnic subordination of Afghanistan (Nawa-i-Waqt, April 17). Although Pakistan likes to see Pashtuns get their due share in Afghanistan's governance, it rejects their "ethnic nationalism," compared to the Taliban's "Islamic nationalism" (The International Journal of Contemporary Sociology, vol. 42(2), pp. 267-293). Pakistan is apprehensive that Pashtun ethnic nationalism will infect Pakistani Pashtuns, whom Islamabad continues to keep de-politicized and thus theologized (The International Journal of Contemporary Sociology, vol. 42(2), pp. 267-293). It bars Pashtun nationalist parties, such as the NWFP-based Awami National Party (ANP) led by Asfandyar Wali Khan, and the Balochistan-based Pashtunkhawa Milli Awami Party (PMAP) led by Mehmood Khan Achakzai, from entering tribal areas of Balochistan and the NWFP, while the Taliban and their militant allies are free to establish an "Islamic Emirate" there.
Conclusions
Not until the "Talibanization" of Afghanistan and Pakistan has been addressed can geopolitical and geoeconomic considerations take center stage. It is, therefore, imperative for Afghanistan and Pakistan to concentrate on stemming cross-border infiltration, which will require the redeployment of Pakistani troops from the tribal areas of the NWFP and Balochistan to joint patrolling the Durand Line. Pakistan should replace its military operation in the NWFP and Balochistan with a political process, allowing Pakistan's mainstream political parties as well as Pashtun nationalists to defuse the ticking bomb of religious fanaticism there. More importantly, Pakistan's Afghan policy needs a makeover from the current ethnic subordination of Afghanistan and the demeaning of Pashtun nationalism, to the affirmation of Afghan nationalism and Pashtun ethnic pride to counter the Taliban's "religious nationalism."
By Tarique Niazi
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370000
Nationalism
The term Nationalism, normally described by fascist acts in World War II, and then the genocides taken place by some nations in the 19th 20th century, has often been misinterpreted in the Persian/Tajik community. But that is a direct result of a perfect brain wash by the Pashtoon nationlaist movements in power in Kaubl, that tried hard to suffocate any opposition to their barbaric rule during the one a half last century.
Here is a brief look into the idea of nationalism and fundamentals of Nation Building.
The term “nationalism” is generally used to describe two phenomena: (1) the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity and (2) the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) self-determination. (1) raises questions about the concept of nation (or national identity), which is often defined in terms of common origin, ethnicity, or cultural ties, and while an individual’s membership in a nation is often regarded as involuntary, it is sometimes regarded as voluntary. (2) raises questions about whether self-determination must be understood as involving having full statehood with complete authority over domestic and international affairs, or whether something less is required.
It is traditional, therefore, to distinguish nations from states — whereas a nation often consists of an ethnic or cultural community, a state is a political entity with a high degree of sovereignty. While many states are nations in some sense, there are many nations which are not fully sovereign states. As an example, the Native American Iroquois constitute a nation but not a state, since they do not possess the requisite political authority over their internal or external affairs. If the members of the Iroquois nation were to strive to form a sovereign state in the effort to preserve their identity as a people, they would be exhibiting a state-focused nationalism.
Nationalism has long been ignored as a topic in political philosophy, written off as a relic from bygone times. It has only recently come into the focus of philosophical debate, partly in consequence of rather spectacular and troubling nationalist clashes, like those in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet republics. The surge of nationalism usually presents a morally ambivalent and for this reason often fascinating picture. “National awakenings” and struggles for political independence are often both heroic and inhumanly cruel; the formation of a recognizably national state often responds to deep popular sentiment, but can and does sometimes bring in its wake inhuman consequences, including violent expulsion and “cleansing” of non-nationals, all the way to organized mass murder. The moral debate on nationalism reflects a deep moral tension between solidarity with oppressed national groups on the one hand and repulsion in the face of crimes perpetrated in the name of nationalism on the other. Moreover, the issue of nationalism points to a wider domain of problems having to do with the treatment of ethnic and cultural differences within a democratic polity, which are arguably among the most pressing problems of contemporary political theory.
In recent years the focus of the debate about nationalism has shifted towards issues in international justice, probably in response to changes on the international scene: bloody nationalist wars such as those in the former Yugoslavia have become less conspicuous, whereas the issues of terrorism, of “clash of civilizations” and of hegemony in the international order have come to occupy public attention. One important link with earlier debates is provided by the contrast between views of international justice based on the predominance of sovereign nation-states and more cosmopolitan views, that either insist upon limiting national sovereignty, or even envisage its disappearance.
First published Thu Nov 29, 2001; substantive revision Sat Sep 24, 2005 by http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nationalism/
Here is a brief look into the idea of nationalism and fundamentals of Nation Building.
The term “nationalism” is generally used to describe two phenomena: (1) the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity and (2) the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) self-determination. (1) raises questions about the concept of nation (or national identity), which is often defined in terms of common origin, ethnicity, or cultural ties, and while an individual’s membership in a nation is often regarded as involuntary, it is sometimes regarded as voluntary. (2) raises questions about whether self-determination must be understood as involving having full statehood with complete authority over domestic and international affairs, or whether something less is required.
It is traditional, therefore, to distinguish nations from states — whereas a nation often consists of an ethnic or cultural community, a state is a political entity with a high degree of sovereignty. While many states are nations in some sense, there are many nations which are not fully sovereign states. As an example, the Native American Iroquois constitute a nation but not a state, since they do not possess the requisite political authority over their internal or external affairs. If the members of the Iroquois nation were to strive to form a sovereign state in the effort to preserve their identity as a people, they would be exhibiting a state-focused nationalism.
Nationalism has long been ignored as a topic in political philosophy, written off as a relic from bygone times. It has only recently come into the focus of philosophical debate, partly in consequence of rather spectacular and troubling nationalist clashes, like those in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet republics. The surge of nationalism usually presents a morally ambivalent and for this reason often fascinating picture. “National awakenings” and struggles for political independence are often both heroic and inhumanly cruel; the formation of a recognizably national state often responds to deep popular sentiment, but can and does sometimes bring in its wake inhuman consequences, including violent expulsion and “cleansing” of non-nationals, all the way to organized mass murder. The moral debate on nationalism reflects a deep moral tension between solidarity with oppressed national groups on the one hand and repulsion in the face of crimes perpetrated in the name of nationalism on the other. Moreover, the issue of nationalism points to a wider domain of problems having to do with the treatment of ethnic and cultural differences within a democratic polity, which are arguably among the most pressing problems of contemporary political theory.
In recent years the focus of the debate about nationalism has shifted towards issues in international justice, probably in response to changes on the international scene: bloody nationalist wars such as those in the former Yugoslavia have become less conspicuous, whereas the issues of terrorism, of “clash of civilizations” and of hegemony in the international order have come to occupy public attention. One important link with earlier debates is provided by the contrast between views of international justice based on the predominance of sovereign nation-states and more cosmopolitan views, that either insist upon limiting national sovereignty, or even envisage its disappearance.
First published Thu Nov 29, 2001; substantive revision Sat Sep 24, 2005 by http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nationalism/
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